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Clerk, United States Court of Appeals
  for the Sixth Circuit
540 Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse Building
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3988
Re: Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388
Dear Mr. Green:
Appellees respectfully submit this supplemental letter brief pursuant to this
Court’s order of May 12, 2011.
I. Standing/Ripeness
A. Background
Plaintiffs are four individuals and the Thomas More Law Center, a public
interest law firm.  They allege that the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage
provision is not a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I powers.
Two of the individual plaintiffs submitted declarations to support their
allegations of standing.  Plaintiff Jann DeMars represented that she does “not have
private health care insurance,” that her “employer does not provide health care
coverage for” her or her children, that she does not “want to be compelled by the
federal government to purchase health care coverage,” and that she is “presently
making significant financial sacrifices to ensure that” she is “able to purchase health
care coverage as required by the Act.”  R-18, Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 2, 3, 7 (Supplemental
DeMars Decl.).  DeMars stated, for example, that she has “cut back on discretionary
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spending” and has had to “forego making home and car repairs” and “purchasing
items for” her home.  Id. ¶ 7.  Plaintiff Steven Hyder represented that he does “not
have private health care insurance,” that he does not “want to be compelled by the
federal government to purchase health care coverage,” that he has “arranged [his]
personal affairs such that it will be a hardship” to pay for health insurance or
penalties, and that the Act “impacts [him] now because [he] will have to reorganize
[his] affairs and essentially change the way [he] live[s] to meet the government’s
demands.”  R-7, Exhibit 5 ¶¶ 2, 5 (Hyder Decl.).
In the district court, the government argued that these allegations fail to
establish standing.  R-12 at 9-14; R-20 at 2-5.  The district court rejected these
arguments, however, concluding that the declarations establish Article III standing
for DeMars and Hyder.  The court recognized that the minimum coverage provision
does not take effect until 2014, and that “the Act might not affect plaintiffs after
2014, if, for instance, changed health circumstances or other events lead plaintiffs
voluntarily to satisfy the minimum coverage provision.”  R-28 at 5.  The court held,
however, that plaintiffs’ “decisions to forego certain spending today, so they will
have the funds to pay for health insurance when the Individual Mandate takes effect
in 2014, are injuries fairly traceable to the Act for the purposes of conferring
standing.”  Id. at 7.  The court found standing on the basis of this “present economic
injury,” id. at 5, reasoning that “the injury-in-fact in this case is the present financial
pressure experienced by plaintiffs due to the requirements of” the minimum coverage
provision.  Id. at 8.  The court acknowledged that a change in plaintiffs’
circumstances could present an issue of mootness, but concluded that the possibility
of such a change does not call plaintiffs’ standing into question.  R-28 at 8.1
The district court also held that the case is ripe for review.  The court explained
that, in considering whether an issue is ripe for review, courts are to “‘evaluate both
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.’”  Id. at 8 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).  The court found it “highly probable” that the individual
      Plaintiffs have not advised the Court of any material change in their personal1
circumstances since the filing of their declarations.  Cf. Board of License
Commissioners v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238, 240 (1985) (noting counsel’s “continuing
duty” to inform the Court of any development that “could have the effect of depriving
the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy”).
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plaintiffs would be required to obtain minimum coverage or pay a penalty, id. at 9
(quoting Kardules v. City of Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1344-46 (6th Cir. 1996)), and
concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge “presents a purely legal issue which ‘would not
be clarified by further factual development.’” Ibid. (quoting Abbott Labs, 387 U.S.
at 149).  Accordingly, the court held that the case “is ripe for consideration.”  Ibid.
The district court’s reasoning has been followed by district courts in other
cases challenging the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision.  For
example, in Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va.
2010), appeal pending, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir.), the district court held that certain
individual plaintiffs had standing because they alleged they would have to undertake
“significant financial planning in advance of the actual purchase of insurance in
2014” and “must incur the preparation costs in the near term.”  Id. at 624.  Similarly,
the district court in State of Florida v. HHS, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683
(N.D. Fla. 2011), appeals pending, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir.), held that
an individual plaintiff had standing because she must “make financial arrangements
now to ensure compliance” in 2014.  Id. at *8; see also Mead v. Holder, __ F. Supp.
2d. __ (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 611139, *5-*8, appeal pending, No. 11-
5047 (D.C. Cir.) (finding standing based on allegations of present economic injury
and substantial probability of future injury); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., __ F. Supp. 2d. __ (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011), 2011 WL 223010, *5-
*7 (finding standing based on allegations of present economic injury).
By contrast, district courts have held that other individual plaintiffs, who did
not allege present economic injury, lack standing to challenge the minimum coverage
provision.  See, e.g., Liberty University, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22 && nn. 6-7; New
Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (D. N.J. Dec. 8, 2010), 2010 WL
5060597, appeal pending, No. 10-4600 (3d Cir.); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-
1033 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010), 2010 WL 3418436, appeal pending, No. 10-56374
(9th Cir.).
B. Article III requirements
Although we view the question as close and recognize that the Court must
reach its own independent judgment on jurisdictional issues, the conclusion that
plaintiff DeMars has established Article III standing to sue appears to be consistent
with Supreme Court precedent, albeit for reasons somewhat different from those
-3-
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articulated by the district court.  A plaintiff’s own decision to incur financial costs,
like other self-imposed harms, will not, by itself, give rise to an Article III injury in
fact.   But a plaintiff may establish standing based on injury expected to result from2
the implementation of a challenged direct regulation of her conduct, provided the
injury is sufficiently imminent, and financial costs may be relevant to the imminence
of the injury.
That understanding is consistent with Supreme Court’s reasoning in New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  There, the State of New York challenged a
provision of federal law that required the State, by January 1, 1996, either to provide
for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders or else
take title to the waste.  The State filed suit against the United States in 1990, six years
before the provision was to take effect, and the case was heard by the Supreme Court
in 1992.  The Supreme Court rejected the “suggestion that, because the take title
provision will not take effect until January 1, 1996, petitioners’ challenge thereto is
unripe.”  Id. at 175.  The Court noted that it “takes many years to develop a new
disposal site,” that “New York must take action now in order to avoid the take title
provision’s consequences,” and that “no party suggests that the State’s waste
generators will have ceased producing waste by 1996.”  Ibid.  The Court held that
“[t]he issue is thus ripe for review.”  Ibid. 
The analysis in New York was framed in terms of ripeness, but the doctrines of
ripeness and standing “‘unquestionably ... overlap.’”  Warshak v. United States, 532
F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).  “Like standing, ripeness
‘is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential
      See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976) (“No [party] can be2
heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.”); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d
644, 654-657, 662-663 (6th Cir. 2007) (opinion of Batchelder, J.) (plaintiffs’
decisions to incur “costs” and “expense[s]” to avoid potential surveillance reflect
actions “incidental to the alleged wrong” not Article III injuries establishing standing,
even if those actions reflect views that “may be reasonable”); id. at 689-691 (opinion
of Gibbons, J.) (such plaintiffs must show that they are actually “subject to the
conduct” they challenge); cf. United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375,
1378-1380 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (plaintiff who is not subject to a “regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory” exercise of government power cannot establish
Article III injury from plaintiff's own decision to cease expressive conduct).
-4-
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reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’”  Ibid. (quoting Nat’l Park Hospitality
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)); accord Connection Distributing
Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 342 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The premise of New York
was that a case meets the requirements of Article III when a plaintiff must take action
years in advance of the statute’s effective date in order to comply with a regulatory
requirement that will apply when the statute ultimately took effect.  The Article III
injury in fact in New York was therefore the regulatory requirement itself, and that
injury was sufficiently “imminent” for Article III purposes because, under the
circumstances, New York had shown that it needed to take steps reasonably necessary
for it to comply with that impending requirement.  To be sure, the circumstances here
differ in important respects from those in New York, and the level of specificity
required at this stage of the proceedings to satisfy plaintiffs’ burden to establish
jurisdiction is far from settled.  Nonetheless, DeMars’ representations about the
actions she presently needs to take to comply with the Act appear adequate to
establish standing to sue.  
C. Prudential considerations
Although the DeMars allegations appear to satisfy requirements of Article III,
we recognize that prudential considerations present an even closer issue.  See
Connection Distributing, 557 F.3d 32 at 342 (ripeness doctrine “‘serves to avoid[] ...
premature adjudication of legal questions’”) (quoting Warshak, 532 F.3d at 525).  In
New York, “no party suggest[ed] that the State’s waste generators will have ceased
producing waste by 1996.”  505 U.S. at 175.  Here, by contrast, the district court
acknowledged that a change in plaintiff’s material circumstances could obviate the
need to address her constitutional challenge.  R-28, at 8.  DeMars does “not object to
health insurance in general,” R-7, Exhibit 4, ¶ 4 (DeMars Decl.); she simply prefers
to “pay for health care services as [she] need[s] them.”  Id. ¶ 3.  That preference could
change if, for example, her medical needs change or her employer offers health
insurance.  Her preference also could be influenced by the new federal tax credits and
federal cost-sharing payments that will be available under the Act.  See U.S. Br. 17.
Moreover, the DeMars declarations do not provide sufficient information to
determine whether she would be subject to a tax penalty if she fails to maintain
minimum coverage in 2014.  The tax penalty will not apply to individuals whose
household income is insufficient to require them to file a federal income tax return,
whose premium payments would exceed 8% of their household income, or who
-5-
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establish that obtaining minimum coverage would impose a hardship.  26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A(e).
This Court’s order directs the parties to address “enforcement mechanisms ...
available to the IRS” and “[w]hat role, if any” they “play in the injury and hardship
requirements.”  Section 5000A provides that a taxpayer must include any liability for
a penalty under Section 5000A with his tax return.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(2). 
Because “‘[t]he Federal tax system is basically one of self-assessment,’” United
States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 122 (2004) (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 601.103(a)), many
taxpayers will voluntarily report and pay any liability they owe under Section 5000A. 
In the absence of voluntary payment, the penalty is “assessed and collected in the
same manner” as other tax liabilities.  26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(g)(1); 6671(a).  The
collection authority of the IRS includes the power to recover tax liabilities through
offset.  In particular, the IRS may credit any overpayment of tax “against any liability
in respect of an internal revenue tax” that the taxpayer owes, 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a),
including a liability for the Section 5000A penalty, as long as the collection period
is open.  The Attorney General also has general authority to file civil suits for unpaid
tax liabilities.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.; id. § 6502(a); United States v.
Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 261-262 (1911).   Thus, if DeMars does not have3
minimum coverage in 2014, and if she is subject to a tax penalty, her constitutional
challenge could be raised in connection with actions taken by the government to
collect the tax penalty.
Notwithstanding the availability of post-implementation review of claims such
as plaintiffs’, there are some prudential factors that counsel in favor of addressing
constitutional challenges to the minimum coverage provision before the provision
goes into effect in two-and-a-half years.  The federal government has acknowledged
in other litigation that the Affordable Care Act’s guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions due to take effect along with the minimum coverage
provision in 2014 — i.e., sections 2701, 2702, 2704 (regarding adults), and 2705(a)
of the Public Health Service Act, as added by section 1201 of the Affordable Care
Act — cannot be severed from the minimum coverage provision.  See, e.g.,
      The minimum coverage provision bars criminal prosecution for a failure to pay3
the penalty and prohibits the IRS from filing a notice of lien with respect to a
taxpayer’s property, or from levying on that property, because of a failure to pay.  26
U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(A), (B).
-6-
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Response/Reply Brief for Appellants at 58, Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-
11067 (11th Cir.) (filed May 18, 2011).  Thus, constitutional challenges to the
minimum coverage provision implicate millions of private transactions that would be
difficult to unravel if deferring consideration of those challenges resulted in their not
being decided until the provision has been implemented.4
II. Facial/As-applied.
Because the minimum coverage provision does not take effect for several years,
plaintiffs challenge the provision on its face.  See R-17 at 4 n.4.   Accordingly,5
plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that “no application of the statute could be
constitutional.”  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).  The Supreme
Court has held that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”  United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
The district court in Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773-74 (E.D.
Va. 2010), questioned the “viability” of what it described as this “Salerno dictum.” 
Id. at  774.  There is no doubt, however, that Salerno remains the governing law. 
Indeed, “the Supreme Court has expressed increasing skepticism of facial challenges
in recent years,” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 529, including in the context of enumerated
power claims, see Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608-610.
      State plaintiffs also have sought to challenge the minimum coverage provision4
in the Florida suit and in Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010),
appeals pending, Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir.).  The minimum coverage
provision, however, applies only to individuals, and Supreme Court precedent
forecloses a suit by a state “to protect her citizens from the operation of federal
statutes.”  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007).  The district courts
in Florida and Virginia erred in holding that a state can circumvent that bar to parens
patriae standing in a suit against the federal government by enacting a state law that
purports to exempt the state’s citizens from the operation of federal law.  See, e.g.,
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 19-22, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 10-1014 (S. Ct.),
2011 WL 915095. 
      This pleading was stricken on other grounds.5
-7-
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There is also no doubt that the Salerno standard applies in the context of a
Commerce Clause challenge.  In United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir.
2001) (en banc), for example, this Court reviewed a Commerce Clause challenge to
a conviction under the Child Support Recovery Act.  Noting that Faasse brought an
as applied challenge to the statute, this Court confirmed that “[f]acial invalidation of
a statute ... is reserved only for when there are no set of circumstances in which the
statute’s application would be constitutional.”  Id. at 487 & n.10.  This Court rejected
Faasse’s contention that the statute was invalid “as applied” to his circumstances
because he had “passively failed to engage in commerce,” finding “no principled
distinction between the parent who fails to send any child support through commerce
and the parent who sends only a fraction of the amount owed.”  Id. at 487 & n.9.
Although plaintiffs here purport to challenge the minimum coverage provision
on its face, even their own legal theory would not render the provision invalid in all
of its applications.  Plaintiffs argue that, as “volitionally uninsured legal residents of
the United States,” they “are not now engaged in any commercial or economic
activity that affects in any way interstate commerce.”  Pl. Br. 30.  Many persons,
however, move in and out of the health insurance market and are thus “active” under
plaintiffs’ own narrow conception of market activity — i.e., if activity in the
insurance market is viewed in isolation, divorced from activity in the health care
services market.  See Response/Reply Br. 16-17, Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 &
11-11067 (citing studies).  Other persons may have insurance that will not meet
minimum standards in 2014, when certain additional consumer protections become
effective.  Even DeMars does not claim that she never had insurance or that she will
not obtain insurance in the future.  To the contrary, she admits that she does “not
object to health insurance in general based on [her] religious beliefs and convictions,”
R-7, Exhibit 4, ¶ 4 (DeMars Decl.), and claims only that she is not “now” active in
the insurance market.  Pl. Br. 30.
Because the minimum coverage provision will apply to individuals who are
“active” in commerce even under plaintiffs’ narrow conception of the term, plaintiffs’
own theory provides no basis on which to invalidate the minimum coverage provision
on its face.  Indeed, the difficult (if not impossible) line-drawing problems inherent
in plaintiffs’ argument make facial adjudication particularly inappropriate.  In
rejecting an argument that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to
“regulate” someone who claimed he “passively failed to engage in commerce,” this
Court noted that the proffered “distinction between ‘active obstruction’ and ‘passive
-8-
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failure’” in that case was “illusory.”  Faasse, 265 F.3d at 487.  Any attempt to draw
a non-illusory line around “inactivity” in the context of the minimum coverage
provision would require consideration of different applications to different types of
individuals, with varying histories with health insurance coverage, varying medical
needs, and varying participation in the health care services market, to determine who
was “active” in commerce.  The need for such an exercise makes it all the more
perilous for the Court to proceed on a facial basis and “‘los[e] the lessons taught by
the particular, to which common law method normally looks.’” Warshak, 532 F.3d
at 533 (quoting Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609).
We do not, of course, concede that there would be any merit to an as-applied
challenge to the minimum coverage provision.  The provision does not regulate
“inactivity”; it regulates the timing and means of payment for services in the health
care services market.  For all of the reasons set out in our brief, the constitutional
challenges to the minimum coverage provision rest on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the regulated economic activity, the role of
insurance as the means of payment for services in the health care market, and the
governing Supreme Court precedent.  The minimum coverage provision validly
regulates a class of persons whose economic conduct, in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce.  Thus, the provision is valid both facially and in all of
its applications.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
-9-
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Respectfully submitted.
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